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Abstract.We propose a syntactic possibilistic belief-change
operator, which operates on a belief base of necessity-valued
formulas. Such a base may be regarded as a finite and com-
pact encoding of a possibility distribution over a possibly
infinite set of interpretations. The proposed operator is de-
signed so that it behaves like a semantic possibilistic belief-
change operator for BDI agents recently proposed in the lit-
erature. The equivalence of the semantic and syntactic oper-
ators is then proved. Experimental results are presented. The
aim of these experiments is to demonstrate that the cost of
belief revision (expressed in terms of the number of entail-
ment checks required) as well as the size of the belief base
do not explode as the number of new pieces of information
(formulas) supplied increases.
Keywords: BDI Agents, Belief Change, Possibility Theory.
1. Introduction
This article is an extended version of [9].
When representing uncertainty in logics, it is of-
ten supposed that there exists a set of possible worlds
(models) which are candidates to be the real world.
The uncertainty is due to the fact that we do not know
which among those worlds corresponds to the real
state. Two different situations can be considered:
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– we cannot distinguish which world has a greater
chance to be the real state than another — the
non-deterministic case;
– some information is available leading us to sup-
pose that not all these worlds are equally possible
to be the real world state.
These two cases are differently treated depending on
the logic used to represent the uncertainty. If we use
probability theory, in the first case, all the worlds are
associated to an equal probability while, in the second
case, we need to have some evidence allowing us to
associate different probabilities to the different worlds
depending on their “distance” with respect to the real
one. If we use possibility theory, the first case corre-
sponds to total ignorance, and the second case may be
solved by considering the plausbility order associated
to the worlds.
Several approaches have been proposed for repre-
senting uncertainty in the BDI (Beliefs Desires and In-
tentions) components of an agent. The main goal of
such approaches is to extend the traditional BDI model
of agency to make it more suitable to represent real
situations in which uncertainty is omnipresent. There
are essentially two ways for dealing with uncertainty.
By using probabilistic-based models which are suit-
able when information about past experiences is avail-
able, and by using possibilistic-based models which
in their turn are more suitable when we lack statisti-
cal data but a notion of order on the events is avail-
able. This latter uncertainty model for representation
has demonstrated its usefulness in representing uncer-
tainty on beliefs since the seminal work by Dubois and
Prade [13]. In that work, the authors pointed out the
close relationships between the theory of belief revi-
sion developed by Gardenförs based on the notion of
epistemic entrenchment, and possibility theory applied
to automated reasoning under uncertainty.
Other proposals have followed. For example, Dra-
goni and Giorgini [11] presented a model for belief
revision in which they integrate symbolic and numer-
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ical methods into a BDI architecture. Casali and col-
leagues [7] proposed a general model for graded BDI
agents and an architecture for modeling the agent’s
graded mental attitudes. Like Casali, Blee and col-
leagues [6] introduce levels in all the mentalistic no-
tions of BDI, as well as using numeric, possibilistic-
type functions in its semantics. We have presented an
integrated theoretical framework, grounded in possi-
bility theory, to account for all the aspects involved
in representing and changing beliefs for cognitive
agents [8]. In that framework, graded beliefs are rep-
resented by means of a possibility distribution over in-
terpretations, and a belief-change operator is proposed
which obeys a possibilistic formulation of the AGM
revision rationality postulates K∗1–K∗8 [16], and is a
generalization of the possibilistic conditioning opera-
tor of Dubois and colleagues [14]. Such operator is one
of the members of a family of possibilistic condition-
ing operators studied in [5].
Although our framework looks interesting and promis-
ing, the use of a possibility distribution to represent be-
liefs, while allowing us to model most of the intuitive
properties in an elegant and natural way, poses com-
putational problems. Indeed, for a propositional lan-
guage, the interpretations are 2 to the power the num-
ber of atomic propositions; with more than a few dozen
atomic propositions, a direct representation of a possi-
bility distribution would require more memory space
than available on most state-of-the-art computers. For
more expressive languages, the set of interpretations
may even be infinite.
Obviously, equivalent, but less demanding, strate-
gies to encode and manipulate beliefs should be de-
vised if such an approach is to be adopted in a re-
alistic setting. In this paper, we propose one strategy
to work around the direct representation of beliefs as
a possibility distribution, which consists of adopting
a syntactic representation, whereby the beliefs of an
agent are represented by means of a fuzzy set of for-
mulas in the language of choice. However, to achieve
full equivalence with the direct, semantic representa-
tion, the belief-change operator has to be reformulated
in terms of the syntactic representation.
To this aim, we devise a syntactic belief-change op-
erator that works on a belief base, i.e., a fuzzy set of
formulas in the language of choice, where membership
degrees are regarded as necessity degrees, and trans-
forms it to account for the arrival of new information
from a partially trusted source. Then we prove that
the syntactic operator is equivalent to the semantic op-
erator. Experimental results are also presented. They
demonstrate that the cost of belief revision (expressed
in terms of the number of entailment checks required)
as well as the size of the belief base do not explode
as the number of new pieces of information (formulas)
supplied increases.
An alternative and very popular approach to repre-
senting beliefs and revising them with new evidence is
Philippe Smets transferable belief model [20], which
is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence,
which in turn may be regarded as a generalization of
the theory of probability. As pointed out by [12], the
main problem with the Dempster-Shafer approach is
its computational complexity. One should generate a
frame of 2|Ω| elements, where Ω is the space of events
(or, equivalently, the set of all interpretations)! This
can be contrasted to the (semantic) possibilistic and a
simple probabilistic representation, which “only” re-
quire to explicitly represent a frame of |Ω| elements.
The reason why a direct probabilistic representa-
tion of beliefs is not a viable alternative to the frame-
work we propose is that, unlike the transferable belief
model, it fails to distinguish stochastic uncertainty, re-
sulting from a system behaving in a random way, from
epistemic uncertainty (or ignorance), resulting from a
lack of knowledge about the system. Such confusion
may lead to incorrect results [20].
Furthermore, probabilistic revision does not satisfy
the AGM postulates, especially because it fails to ad-
dress the notion of minimal change [12].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly
reviews background notions required to follow the pa-
per. Section 3 discusses the semantic and the syntactic
representation, showing their equivalence. Section 4
reviews the semantic belief-change operator, then pro-
poses a syntactic belief-change operators, and proves
its equivalence. Section 5 provides an empirical study
of the behavior of the proposed operator. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the essential back-
ground and definitions on fuzzy set theory and possi-
bility theory.
2.1. Fuzzy Sets
Fuzzy sets [21] are a generalization of classical
(crisp) sets obtained by replacing the characteristic
function of a setA, χA, which takes up values in {0, 1}
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(χA(x) = 1 iff x ∈ A, χA(x) = 0 otherwise) with a
membership function µA, which can take up any value
in [0, 1]. The value µA(x) or, more simply, A(x) is the
membership degree of element x in A, i.e., the degree
to which x belongs in A.
A fuzzy set is completely defined by its member-
ship function. Therefore, it is useful to define a few
terms describing various features of this function, sum-
marized in Figure 1. Given a fuzzy set A, its core
is the (conventional) set of all elements x such that
A(x) = 1; its support, supp(A), is the set of all x
such that A(x) > 0. A fuzzy set is normal if its core
is nonempty. The set of all elements x of A such that
A(x) ≥ α, for a given α ∈ (0, 1], is called the α-cut of
A, denoted Aα. Sometimes it is convenient to define
also the notion of a strict α-cut, A>α, as the set of all
elements x of A such that A(x) > α.
Fig. 1. Core, support, and α-cuts of a set A of the real line.
A convenient notational convention we will adopt
throughout this paper for fuzzy sets, when the universe
of discourse is discrete is, for fuzzy set A,
A =
A(x1)
x1
+
A(x2)
x2
+ . . . =
∑
i
A(xi)
xi
. (1)
This notation is nothing more than a formal device and
the fractions do not have to be interpreted as divisions
but just as ordered pairs, while the+ does not stand for
algebraic sum but rather for a function-theoretic union.
The usual set-theoretic operations of union, inter-
section, and complement can be defined as a gener-
alization of their counterparts on classical sets by in-
troducing two families of operators, called triangular
norms and triangular co-norms. In practice, it is usual
to employ the min norm for intersection and the max
co-norm for union. Given two fuzzy sets A and B, and
an element x,
(A ∪B)(x) = max{A(x), B(x)}; (2)
(A ∩B)(x) = min{A(x), B(x)}; (3)
A¯(x) = 1−A(x). (4)
Finally, given two fuzzy sets A and B, A ⊆ B if and
only if, for all element x, A(x) ≤ B(x).
2.2. Possibility Theory
The membership function of a fuzzy set describes
the more or less possible and mutually exclusive values
of one (or more) variable(s). Such a function can then
be seen as a possibility distribution [22]. Indeed, if F
designates the fuzzy set of possible values of a variable
X , πX = µF is called the possibility distribution asso-
ciated to X . The identity µF (v) = πX(v) means that
the membership degree of v to F is equal to the possi-
bility degree of X being equal to v when all we know
aboutX is that its value is in F . A possibility distribu-
tion for which there exists a completely possible value
(∃v0;π(v0) = 1) is said to be normalized.
Definition 1 (Possibility and Necessity Measures) A
possibility distribution π induces a possibility measure
and its dual necessity measure, denoted by Π and N
respectively. Both measures apply to a crisp set A and
are defined as follows:
Π(A) = max
s∈A
π(s); (5)
N(A) = 1−Π(A¯) = min
s∈A¯
{1− π(s)}. (6)
In words, the possibility measure of set A corre-
sponds to the greatest of the possibilities associated to
its elements; conversely, the necessity measure of A is
equivalent to the impossibility of its complement A¯.
3. Representing Graded Beliefs
3.1. Language and Interpretations
Information manipulated by a cognitive agent must
be somehow represented. For the sake of simplicity, we
use here perhaps the simplest symbolic representation,
in the form of a classical propositional language.
4 C. da Costa Pereira et al. / Syntactic Possibilistic Belief Change Operator
Definition 2 (Language) Let A be a finite1 set of
atomic propositions and let L be the propositional lan-
guage such that A ∪ {⊤,⊥} ⊆ L, and, ∀φ, ψ ∈ L,
¬φ ∈ L, φ ∧ ψ ∈ L, φ ∨ ψ ∈ L.
As usual, one may define additional logical connec-
tives and consider them as useful shorthands for com-
binations of connectives of L, e.g., φ ⊃ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ.
We will denote by Ω = {0, 1}A the set of all inter-
pretations on A. An interpretation I ∈ Ω is a function
I : A → {0, 1} assigning a truth value pI to every
atomic proposition p ∈ A and, by extension, a truth
value φI to all formulas φ ∈ L.
Definition 3 The notation [φ] denotes the set of all
models (namely, interpretations satisfying φ) of a for-
mula φ ∈ L:
[φ] = {I ∈ Ω : I |= φ}.
Likewise, if S ⊆ L is a set of formulas,
[S] = {I ∈ Ω : ∀φ ∈ S, I |= φ} =
⋂
φ∈S
[φ].
3.2. Syntactic and Semantic Representations
Two alternative ways for representing graded beliefs
can be obtained by following two distinct lines of rea-
soning.
The first line of reasoning starts from the logical
idea of a belief set, like the one used in the AGM theory
of revision [1]. In the literature on non-graded belief
revision, the agent’s belief state may be represented in
different ways. As belief sets, which are sets of sen-
tences closed under logical consequence, like in [1],
or, alternatively, as belief bases, which are sets of sen-
tences that are not logically closed [18] and contain the
sentences that represent the explicit beliefs from which
all the other beliefs can be derived. The representation
based on belief sets has some advantages, but is not
computationally adequate. On the other hand, a belief
base may be regarded as a finite and compact repre-
sentation of a belief set, and is, therefore, much more
suited to computation.
As for the representation of graded beliefs, one can
allow some formulas of the base to be believed only
1Like in [3], we adopt the restriction to the finite case in order to
use standard definitions of possibilistic logic. Extensions of possi-
bilistic logic to the infinite case are discussed for example in [10].
to a given degree, thus obtaining a fuzzy belief base,
which is a fuzzy set B of formulas. The degree to
which a given formula φ ∈ L is believed can be calcu-
lated as
B(φ) = max{α : Bα ⊢ φ}. (7)
This is the syntactic representation of graded beliefs.
Alternatively, one may regard a belief as a necessity
degree induced by a normalized possibility distribution
π on the possible worlds I ∈ Ω [4]:
π : Ω→ [0, 1]; (8)
where π(I) is the possibility degree of interpretation
I. In this case, the degree to which a given formula
φ ∈ L is believed can be calculated as
B(φ) = N([φ]) = 1−max
I6|=φ
π(I), (9)
where N is the necessity measure induced by π. This
is the semantic representation of graded beliefs.
This latter was our choice in the original proposal of
the theoretical framework [8].
3.3. Equivalence
A direct consequence of a fundamental result on the
equivalence between sets of necessity-values formulas
and possibility distributions [15], is that the syntactic
and the semantic representations of graded beliefs are
equivalent. Therefore, they may be used interchange-
ably as convenience demands.
This means that, given a fuzzy belief base B such
that, for all α, Bα is consistent, one can construct a
possibility distribution π such that, for all φ ∈ L,
N([φ]) = max{α : Bα ⊢ φ}, where Bα is the α-cut
of fuzzy belief base B.
In particular, π may be defined as follows: for all
I ∈ Ω,
π(I) = min
φ:I6|=φ
{1−B(φ)} = 1− max
φ:I6|=φ
B(φ), (10)
or, equivalently,
π(I) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬φI}, (11)
where φI denotes the minterm of I, i.e., the formula
satisfied by I only.
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Notice that π is normalized. Indeed, since, by hy-
pothesis, for all α, Bα is consistent, there exists an
interpretation I∗ ∈ Ω, such that, for all α ∈ (0, 1],
I∗ |= Bα; therefore, π(I
∗) = 1, because no formula
φ exists such that I∗ 6|= φ and B(φ) > 0.
3.4. Properties of Graded Beliefs
Straightforward consequences of the properties of
possibility and necessity measures are that B(φ) >
0 ⇒ B(¬φ) = 0, this means that if the agent some-
how believes φ then it cannot believe ¬φ at all; and,
for all φ, ψ ∈ L,
B(⊤) = 1, (12)
B(⊥) = 0, (13)
B(φ ∧ ψ) = min{B(φ),B(ψ)}, (14)
B(φ ∨ ψ) ≥max{B(φ),B(ψ)}. (15)
Another straightforward property is that, for all φ ∈
L, B(φ) ≥ B(φ).
The idea of a syntactic representation of beliefs
is that it should be parsimonious, and ideally mini-
mal with respect to (fuzzy) set inclusion, i.e., the be-
lief base does not need to include explicitly formulas
whose degree of belief can be derived from it. In par-
ticular, this means that if formula φ is already a mem-
ber of B with degree B(φ), then, if α ≤ B(φ),
B ∪
α
φ
= B.
In general, if α ≤ B(φ), which is equivalent to say-
ing that Bα ⊢ φ, adding
α
φ
to B would be redundant,
and may be dispensed with. Since all tautologies are
always believed to degree 1, adding a tautology to a be-
lief base is always redundant, and may thus be avoided.
4. Belief Change
In this section we begin by briefly reviewing the se-
mantic belief-change operator proposed in [8], then we
propose a syntactic belief-change operator and prove
its equivalence with the semantic operator.
4.1. Semantic Operator
Agents update their possibility distribution π in light
of new information φ ∈ L coming from a source
trusted to a certain extent τ ∈ [0, 1] by means of the
following belief change operator [8], which is formu-
lated in terms of the semantic representation of beliefs.
Definition 4 (Belief Change Operator) The possibil-
ity distribution π′ which induces the new belief set B′
after receiving information φ from a source trusted to
degree τ is computed from possibility distribution π
relevant to the previous belief set B (B′ = B ∗ τ
φ
,
π′ = π ∗ τ
φ
) as follows: for all interpretation I,
π′(I) =


π(I)
1−B(¬φ)
,
if I |= φ and
B(¬φ) < 1;
1,
if I |= φ and
B(¬φ) = 1;
min{π(I), 1− τ}, if I 6|= φ.
(16)
The first case of Equation 16 is formally equivalent
to the Goguen implication, which is the residuum
Π([φ]) ⇒ π(I) of the t-norm used to condition the
possibility distribution on the models of φ, here the
product2. The condition B(¬φ) < 1 is equivalent to
∃I ′ : I ′ |= φ⇒ π(I ′) > 0, i.e., Π([φ]) > 0; likewise,
the condition B(¬φ) = 1 is equivalent to Π([φ]) = 0,
which implies π(I) = 0 ∀I |= φ. Therefore, The
second case in Equation 16 provides for the revision
of beliefs that contradict φ. In general, the operator
treats new information φ in the negative sense: being
told φ denies the possibility of world situations where
φ is false (third case of Equation 16). The possibility
of world situations where φ is true may only increase
due to the first case in equation 16 or revision (sec-
ond case of Equation 16). If information from a fully
trusted source contradicts an existing proposition that
is fully believed, then revising with the above operator
leads the agent to believe the more recent information
and give up the oldest to restore consistency.
The belief change operator ∗ of Definition 4 is hy-
brid in that it uses different t-norms to condition mod-
els and countermodels of φ. Such hybrid operator have
been studied in [5]. In particular, this operator uses
the product t-norm to condition models and the min t-
norm to condition countermodels. The motivation for
using this particular combination is that using the min
for countermodels is suitable for representing weary or
conservative agents, whereas using product for models
is suitable for representing open-minded or insecure
agents who, if they receive new information which
contradicts one among their old beliefs, start to ques-
2As one would expect, it is possible to generalize this definition
to any other t-norm. However, this is not the focus of this article:
here, we are interested in reformulating this particular definition in
syntactic terms.
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tion also their other beliefs. Of course, we are not
claiming that this operator makes sense in all scenar-
ios: other operators may be more appropriate to deal
with other situations.
It has been proved [8] that the belief change oper-
ator ∗ of Definition 4 obeys a possibilistic formula-
tion of the AGM revision rationality postulates K∗1–
K∗8 [16].
It is easy to verify that the ∗ operator is a gener-
alization of the possibilistic conditioning operator of
Dubois and colleagues [14].
After recalling that the expansion of a crisp set of
formulas K with a formula φ ∈ L is K + φ = {ψ :
K ∪ {φ} ⊢ ψ}, let us define the expansion of a fuzzy
set of formulas B with a formula φ ∈ L from a source
trusted to degree τ , for all ψ ∈ L, as
(
B+
τ
φ
)
(ψ) = max
{
α :
(
B ∪
τ
φ
)
α
⊢ ψ
}
. (17)
In terms of possibility distribution, this corresponds to
(
π +
τ
φ
)
(I) = min{π(I), φI+(1−φI)(1−τ)}.
(18)
4.2. Syntactic Operator
First of all, it is reasonable to require that a syntac-
tic belief change operator produces a new belief base
B′ = B + τ
φ
, starting from B, by using only formulas
that are in supp(B) and φ.
Four examples of increasing difficulty will help us
to better frame the problem of how to express the se-
mantic belief-change operator in terms of the syntactic
representation.
Example 1 Let B = 1
p
+ 0.2
p⊃q , and let us calculate
B′ = B ∗ 0.6¬q . The α-cuts of B are
Bα =
{
{p}, for 0.2 < α ≤ 1;
{p, p ⊃ q}, for 0 < α ≤ 0.2.
(19)
Since we only know the semantic belief-change opera-
tor, we have to transform the beliefs represented by B
into the corresponding possibility distribution π, by us-
ing Equation 11. The set of interpretations Ω contains
the following four interpretations, listed with their cor-
responding minterms:
I0 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 0}, φI0 = ¬p ∧ ¬q,
I1 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 1}, φI1 = ¬p ∧ q,
I2 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 0}, φI2 = p ∧ ¬q,
I3 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1}, φI3 = p ∧ q.
Therefore,
π(I0) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q} = 0,
π(I1) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ q ⊃ p} = 0,
π(I2) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ⊃ q} = 0.8,
π(I3) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ ¬q} = 1.
Now, we apply the semantic belief-change operator to
obtain π′ = π ∗ 0.6¬q , by keeping in mind that B(q) =
1− 0.8 = 0.2:
π′(I0) =
π(I0)
1−B(q) =
0
0.8 = 0,
π′(I1) = min{π(I1), 0.4} = 0,
π′(I2) =
π(I2)
1−B(q) =
0.8
0.8 = 1,
π′(I3) = min{π(I3), 0.4} = 0.4.
From possibility distribution π′ we may compute the
degree to which all relevant formulas are now believed:
B
′(p) = 1−maxI6|=p π
′(I) = 1,
B
′(p ⊃ q) = 1−maxI6|=p⊃q π
′(I) = 0,
B
′(¬q) = 1−maxI6|=¬q π
′(I) = 0.6.
Therefore, we may conclude that a reasonable candi-
date for B′ should be the fuzzy set 1
p
+ 0.6¬q . Indeed, it
is easy to verify that its corresponding possibility dis-
tribution is π′, as expected: the α-cuts of B′ are
B′α =
{
{p}, for 0.6 < α ≤ 1,
{p,¬q}, for 0 < α ≤ 0.6,
(20)
and applying Equation 11 to compute the correspond-
ing possibility distribution yields π′.
What this example tells us is that, in this case, the
belief base has been changed by removing formula
p ⊃ q, which contradicts the new information ¬q and
was believed to degree 0.2 only, and by adding the new
formula ¬q with membership degree τ = 0.6. ⋆
It is interesting to observe what happens when the
initial belief base contains formulas that have nothing
to do with incoming information. The following exam-
ple is a variation of the previous one, where another
formula using atom r, completely independent of both
p and p ⊃ q, is introduced into the initial belief base.
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Example 2 Let B = 1
p
+ 0.2
p⊃q +
0.3
r
, and let us calcu-
late, just like in the previous example, B′ = B ∗ 0.6¬q .
The α-cuts of B are now
Bα =


{p}, for 0.3 < α ≤ 1;
{p, r}, for 0.2 < α ≤ 0.3;
{p, p ⊃ q}, for 0 < α ≤ 0.2.
(21)
The set of interpretations Ω contains the following
eight interpretations, listed with their corresponding
minterms:
I0 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 0, r 7→ 0}, φI0 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r,
I1 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 1, r 7→ 0}, φI1 = ¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r,
I2 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 0, r 7→ 0}, φI2 = p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r,
I3 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1, r 7→ 0}, φI3 = p ∧ q ∧ ¬r,
I4 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 0, r 7→ 1}, φI4 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ r,
I5 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 1, r 7→ 1}, φI5 = ¬p ∧ q ∧ r,
I6 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 0, r 7→ 1}, φI6 = p ∧ ¬q ∧ r,
I7 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1, r 7→ 1}, φI7 = p ∧ q ∧ r.
Applying Equation 11 yields the possibility distribu-
tion π corresponding to belief base B:
π(I0) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q ∨ r} = 0,
π(I1) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ ¬q ∨ r} = 0,
π(I2) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ q ∨ r} = 0.7,
π(I3) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ r} = 0.7,
π(I4) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q ∨ ¬r} = 0,
π(I5) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r} = 0,
π(I6) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ q ∨ ¬r} = 0.8,
π(I7) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r} = 1.
Now, we apply the semantic belief-change operator to
obtain π′ = π ∗ 0.6¬q , by keeping in mind that B(q) =
1− 0.8 = 0.2:
π′(I0) =
π(I0)
1−B(q) =
0
0.8 = 0,
π′(I1) = min{π(I1), 0.4} = 0,
π′(I2) =
π(I2)
1−B(q) =
0.7
0.8 = 0.875,
π′(I3) = min{π(I3), 0.4} = 0.4,
π′(I4) =
π(I4)
1−B(q) =
0
0.8 = 0,
π′(I5) = min{π(I5), 0.4} = 0,
π′(I6) =
π(I6)
1−B(q) =
0.8
0.8 = 1,
π′(I7) = min{π(I7), 0.4} = 0.4.
From π′, we compute the degree to which all relevant
formulas are now believed:
B
′(p) = 1−maxI6|=p π
′(I) = 1,
B
′(p ⊃ q) = 1−maxI6|=p⊃q π
′(I) = 0,
B
′(r) = 1−maxI6|=r π
′(I) = 0.125,
B
′(¬q) = 1−maxI6|=¬q π
′(I) = 0.6.
Therefore, we may conclude that B′ must be the fuzzy
set 1
p
+ 0.6¬q +
0.125
r
. We may verify that its correspond-
ing possibility distribution is π′.
What this example tells us is that formulas like r,
that are believed to a larger degree than the negation of
new information, must be “weakened” to a certain ex-
tent by the arrival of new information that contradicts
current beliefs. The amount of such weakening appears
to be inversely proportional to the degree to which new
information contradicts current beliefs. In the case of
r,
B′(r) = 1−
1−B(r)
1−B(q)
= 1−
1− 0.3
1− 0.2
= 1− 0.875 = 0.125.
⋆
Things get even more complicated with the follow-
ing example, which demonstrates the need of including
“novel” formulas created as a disjunction of previously
held beliefs and incoming information that contradicts
current beliefs, to replace formulas removed from the
initial belief base.
Example 3 Let B = 0.6¬p +
0.4
q
, and let us calculate
B′ = B ∗ 0.2
p
. The α-cuts of B are
Bα =


∅ for 0.6 < α ≤ 1;
{¬p}, for 0.4 < α ≤ 0.6;
{¬p, q}, for 0 < α ≤ 0.4.
(22)
The set of interpretations Ω contains the following
four interpretations, listed with their corresponding
minterms:
I0 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 0}, φI0 = ¬p ∧ ¬q,
I1 = {p 7→ 0, q 7→ 1}, φI1 = ¬p ∧ q,
I2 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 0}, φI2 = p ∧ ¬q,
I3 = {p 7→ 1, q 7→ 1}, φI3 = p ∧ q.
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Applying Equation 11 yields the possibility distribu-
tion π corresponding to belief base B:
π(I0) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q} = 0.6,
π(I1) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ q ⊃ p} = 1,
π(I2) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ⊃ q} = 0.4,
π(I3) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ ¬q} = 0.4.
Now, we apply the semantic belief-change operator to
obtain π′ = π ∗ 0.2
p
, by keeping in mind thatB(¬p) =
0.6:
π′(I0) = min{π(I0), 0.8} = 0.6,
π′(I1) = min{π(I1), 0.8} = 0.8,
π′(I2) =
π(I2)
1−B(¬p) =
0.4
0.4 = 1,
π′(I3) =
π(I3)
1−B(¬p) =
0.4
0.4 = 1.
From π′, we may compute:
B
′(p) = 1−maxI6|=p π
′(I) = 0.2,
B
′(¬p) = 1−maxI6|=¬p π
′(I) = 0,
B
′(q) = 1−maxI6|=q π
′(I) = 0.
However, belief base B′ cannot be 0.2
p
, as one would
expect based on the two previous examples, because
that would give
1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q} = 0.8 6= π
′(I0).
The only way of obtaining the correct result by using
only formulas that either were in the initial base or in
incoming information is by observing thatB′(p∨q) =
0.4 and thus by letting B′ = 0.2
p
+ 0.4
p∨q .
In other words, formula q that had to be given up
because it was not believed more than ¬p must be re-
placed by its disjunction with incoming information p,
giving p∨ q, with the same degree of membership as q
in the initial base.
Why did not this feature show up in the previous
examples? The reason is that the disjunction with in-
coming information would give a tautology, which is
always fully believed: its inclusion in B′ would be re-
dundant and could thus be dispensed with. ⋆
From the last example, it is not completely clear
whether a formula of the form ψ ∨ φ, where φ is the
incoming formula, must be added to replace formulas
that got deleted only, or it must be added for all formu-
las ψ in the initial base. The following example helps
us to clarify this issue.
Example 4 Let us use the same Ω as in the previous
example, and, given
B =
0.9
p ⊃ q
+
0.7
p ∨ q
+
0.7
q
+
0.25
¬(p ∧ q)
+
0.25
p⊕ q
+
0.25
¬p
+
0.25
¬p ∧ q
,
where p ⊕ q ≡ (¬p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q) represents the
“exclusive or” logical operator, let us calculate B′ =
B ∗ 0.6
p
.
The possibility distribution π corresponding to be-
lief base B may be determined as usual, by applying
Equation 11:
π(I0) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q} = 0.3,
π(I1) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ q ⊃ p} = 1,
π(I2) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ⊃ q} = 0.1,
π(I3) = 1−max{α : Bα ⊢ ¬p ∨ ¬q} = 0.75.
Now, B(¬p) = 0.25 and the semantic belief change
yields
π′(I0) = min{π(I0), 0.4} = 0.3,
π′(I1) = min{π(I1), 0.4} = 0.4,
π′(I2) =
π(I2)
1−B(¬p) =
0.1
0.75 = 0.1333,
π′(I3) =
π(I3)
1−B(¬p) =
0.75
0.75 = 1,
from which we must infer that
B′ =
0.8667
p ⊃ q
+
0.7
p ∨ q
+
0.6
p
.
Notice that B′ must be obtained by adding formulas
ψ ∨ p for all the formulas originally in B to the con-
tracted belief base. What happens then is that all of
those ψ ∨ p either reduce to p ∨ q or to a tautology:
(p ⊃ q) ∨ p = ¬p ∨ q ∨ p = ⊤ ∨ q = ⊤,
(p ∨ q) ∨ p = p ∨ q,
¬(p ∧ q) ∨ p = ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ p = ⊤ ∨ ¬q = ⊤,
(p⊕ q) ∨ p = (¬p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q) ∨ p = p ∨ q,
¬p ∨ p = ⊤,
(¬p ∧ q) ∨ p = (¬p ∨ p) ∧ (p ∨ q) = ⊤ ∧ (p ∨ q)
= p ∨ q.
Furthermore, there is no need to include 0.6
q
in B′,
since q may be deduced from p and p ⊃ q, both mem-
bers of B′0.6.
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Had not 0.7
p∨q been included in B
′, the term 0.6
p∨q , re-
sulting from B′(p ∨ q) = 1 − 0.30.75 , would have been
there instead, giving
1−max{α : Bα ⊢ p ∨ q} = 0.4 6= π
′(I0).
This means that ψ ∨ φ must be included in B′ for all
formulas ψ in B. ⋆
One of the oldest ideas in belief revision theory, due
to Isaac Levi, is that changing your beliefs given some
new information should proceed in two steps: first,
give up old beliefs contradicted by new information;
second, add the new information [19].
The syntactic expansion operator +, equivalent to
the semantic expansion operator of Equation 18 may
be defined as
B +
τ
φ
= B ∪
τ
φ
. (23)
Notice that, if φ is already in B at least to degree τ ,
B ∪ τ
φ
= B.
As for the syntactic contraction operator, it is not
obvious how it should be defined. A first guess at it
might be what we may call simple contraction,
B − φ = B ∩B>B(φ), (24)
i.e., B with all formulas belonging to it up to the de-
gree to which φ is believed removed. However, for rea-
sons that should be clear from our discussion of the ex-
amples, we prefer to resort to the following normalized
contraction operator: for all ψ ∈ L,
(B .− φ)(ψ) =
{
0, if B(ψ) ≤ B(φ),
1− 1−B(ψ)1−B(φ) , if B(ψ) > B(φ),
(25)
which is almost the same as Equation 24, except that
it redistributes between 0 and 1 the degree of member-
ship of all the formulas that do not get removed.
A syntactic belief-change operator may now be de-
fined as a two-stage operator, which first contracts the
belief base by the negation of the information commu-
nicated by a partially trusted source, and then expands
it with such new information.
Definition 5 (Belief Change Operator) The belief
base B′ which induces the new belief set B′ after re-
Fig. 2. A flow chart of the syntactic belief change operator, showing
how B(ψ), given as input, is changed into B′(ψ).
ceiving information φ from a source trusted to degree
τ is computed from belief base B relevant to the previ-
ous belief setB (B′ = B∗ τ
φ
, B′ = B ∗ τ
φ
) as follows:
B′ = (B .− ¬φ) +
τ
φ
+
∑
ψ
B(ψ)
φ ∨ ψ
. (26)
An interesting feature of the above definition is that
Equation 26 may be regarded as a fuzzy generalization
of the well-known Levi identityK∗φ = (K−¬φ)+φ.
Definition 5 may be translated into the following
procedure:
1. remove from belief base B all formulas ψ such
that B(ψ) ≤ B(¬φ);
2. redistribute the degrees of membership of all
extant formulas ψ, now ranging in (B(¬φ), 1],
by remapping them to the full (0, 1] interval:
B′(ψ) = 1− 1−B(ψ)1−B(¬φ) ;
3. add formula φ with membership degree τ to the
resulting contracted belief base;
4. finally, for all formula ψ, add φ ∨ ψ with mem-
bership degree B(ψ); of course, only formulas
with a non-zero membership degree in the initial
belief base will have to be considered.
An alternative way of writing Equation 26, which
emphasizes the way individual membership degrees
10 C. da Costa Pereira et al. / Syntactic Possibilistic Belief Change Operator
change, is, for all ψ ∈ L,
B′(ψ) =


max{τ,B(φ)}, ψ = φ,
max{B(ξ), B(φ)}, ψ = φ ∨ ξ,
0,
ψ 6= φ, ψ 6= φ∨ ξ,
B(ψ) ≤ B(¬φ),
1−
1−B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
,
ψ 6= φ, ψ 6= φ∨ ξ,
B(ψ) > B(¬φ).
(27)
Notice the striking formal symmetry between this
equation and Equation 16. The flow chart shown in
Figure 2 makes it clear how the membership values of
formulas in the belief base change as the consequence
of applying Equation 27.
In the special case where B(¬φ) = 1 and τ = 1,
B ∗ τ
φ
= φ. When B(¬φ) = 0, B ∗ τ
φ
= B + τ
φ
, i.e.,
belief change reduces to simple expansion.
4.3. Equivalence
Equivalence between the semantic and syntactic op-
erators will be proved by showing that the syntactic
operator applied to a belief base B corresponding to
possibility distribution π yields a revised belief base
B′ whose corresponding possibility distribution is ex-
actly the distribution π′ one would obtain by applying
the semantic operator to distribution π. This is summa-
rized in the following commutative diagram:
π ∗sem
τ
φ
→ π′
↑ ↑
B ∗syn
τ
φ
→ B′
, (28)
where ∗sem symbolizes the semantic belief-change op-
erator of Definition 4 and ∗syn stands for the syntactic
belief-change operator of Definition 5.
Theorem 1 Let B be a belief base and πB its corre-
sponding possibility distribution. For all φ ∈ L and
τ ∈ (0, 1], let B′ = B ∗ τ
φ
and πB′ be the possibility
distribution corresponding to B′. Then,
πB′ = πB ∗
τ
φ
. (29)
Proof: According to Equation 10, for all I,
πB(I) = 1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B(ψ). (30)
For convenience of notation, let π′B = πB ∗
τ
φ
. Apply-
ing the semantic belief-change operator to πB yields,
by Definition 4, for all I,
π′B(I) =


1−maxψ:I6|=ψ B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
,
I |= φ,
B(¬φ) < 1;
1,
I |= φ,
B(¬φ) = 1;
min
{
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B(ψ), 1− τ
}
, I 6|= φ.
(31)
On the other hand, according to Equation 10, for all I,
πB′(I) = 1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ). (32)
Therefore, in order to prove that π′B = πB′ , we must
prove the following three theses, corresponding to each
of the three conditions of Equation 31: for all I,
1. if I |= φ and B(¬φ) < 1,
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) =
1−maxψ:I6|=ψ B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
; (33)
2. if I |= φ and B(¬φ) = 1,
max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) = 0; (34)
3. finally, if I 6|= φ,
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) = min
{
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B(ψ), 1− τ
}
.
(35)
To prove Thesis 1, it suffices to substitute the left-
hand side of Equation 33 with its definition:
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) = 1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
{
1−
1−B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
}
=
= min
ψ:I6|=ψ
1−B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
=
=
1
1−B(¬φ)
min
ψ:I6|=ψ
{1−B(ψ)} =
=
1−maxψ:I6|=ψ B(ψ)
1−B(¬φ)
.
To prove Thesis 2, we simply observe that since, by
hypothesis, B(¬φ) = 1, B(ψ) ≤ B(¬φ) for all ψ;
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therefore, for all ψ 6= φ, B′(ψ) = 0 (third case of
Equation 27).
As for Thesis 3, Equation 35 may be rewritten as
1− max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) = 1−max
{
max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B(ψ), τ
}
.
Therefore, we have to prove that, if I 6|= φ,
max
ψ:I6|=ψ
B′(ψ) = max
ψ:I6|=ψ
{B(ψ), τ} . (36)
Notice that φ is among the formulas not satisfied by I
and, by the first case of Equation 27,maxψ:I6|=ψ B
′(ψ) ≥
B′(φ) ≥ τ and maxψ:I6|=ψ B(ψ) ≥ B(φ).
Let us concentrate on the most believed formula ψ∗
among the formulas not satisfied by I,
ψ∗ = arg max
ψ:I6|=ψ
{B(ψ), τ} .
To begin with, we remark that ψ∗ might be φ. How-
ever, if that were the case, we know that B′(φ) =
max{B(φ), τ} (first case of Equation 27).
Now, if ψ∗ 6= φ, either B(ψ∗) ≤ B(¬φ), in which
case it is removed from the belief base, or B(ψ∗) >
B(¬φ), in which case it is kept, but its degree of mem-
bership is decreased by the normalized contraction op-
erator (Step 2 of the procedure). In any case,B′(ψ∗) ≤
B(ψ∗) and, a fortiori, B′(ψ∗) ≤ max{B(ψ∗), τ}.
However, Step 4 of the procedure or, equivalently, the
second case of Equation 27 guarantees that a new for-
mula, namely ψ∗ ∨ φ, is then introduced into the new
belief base B′, with the same membership degree as
ψ∗ in the original base B:
B′(ψ∗ ∨ φ) = B(ψ∗).
Furthermore, it must be B(ψ∗) ≥ τ , otherwise we
could choose ψ∗ = φ (see remark above). Therefore,
B′(ψ∗ ∨ φ) = max{B(ψ∗), τ}.
Since the same happens to all formulas ψ not satisfied
by I, it must be that B′(ψ∗ ∨ φ) = maxψ:I6|=ψ B
′(ψ).
Therefore, Equation 36 must necessarily hold. ✷
Fig. 3. A screenshot of KOBDIG’s user interface: the user is entering
input 0.6
p
to revise the initial belief base B of Example 4.2.
Fig. 4. A screenshot of KOBDIG’s user interface: the belief tab of
the agent’s mental state pane shows the result of revising belief base
B of Example 4.2 by 0.6
p
.
5. Experiments
A Java implementation of the syntactic belief change
operator described in Section 4 is available in the open-
source KOBDIG project, hosted on SourceForge3.
Figure 3 and 4 show two screenshots of KOBDIG’s
user interface while computing Example 4.2 above.
The Java code of method updateBeliefs of
class Agent in KOBDIG, which implements the
belief-change operator, is given in Figure 5. Of all
the operations performed by this method, the most
computation-intensive is by far the calculation of the
degree of belief in a formula, carried out by method
PossibilisticFactBase.necessity, which
implements Equation 7 by checking, for each α ∈
Λ(B), where Λ(B) is the level set of B, i.e., the set
of non-null membership degrees α such that at least
3Project URL: http://sourceforge.net/p/kobdig/.
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public void updateBeliefs(Fact fact, TruthDegree trust) {
// First of all, compute the degree to which the incoming
// fact contradicts the agent’s current beliefs:
TruthDegree contradiction = beliefs.necessity(fact.negated());
PossibilisticFactBase newBeliefs = new PossibilisticFactBase();
// Insert into the revised base only those facts whose degree
// of membership is greater than the "contradiction":
Iterator<Fact> i = beliefs.factIterator();
while(i.hasNext()) {
Fact psi = i.next();
TruthDegree t = beliefs.membership(psi);
if(!contradiction.isAtLeastAsTrueAs(t)) {
// Redistribute the degrees of membership:
TruthDegree tcond = new TruthDegree(1.0 -
t.negated().doubleValue() /
contradiction.negated().doubleValue());
newBeliefs.tell(psi, tcond);
}
}
// For each fact in the base, add a new fact whose formula is
// the disjunction of the existing fact and the incoming fact:
i = beliefs.factIterator();
while(i.hasNext()) {
Fact psi = i.next();
TruthDegree t = beliefs.necessity(psi);
Fact disjunction = new Fact(new PropositionalFormula(
Operator.OR, psi.formula(), fact.formula()));
if(!newBeliefs.necessity(disjunction).isAtLeastAsTrueAs(t))
newBeliefs.tell(disjunction, t);
}
// Add the incoming fact to the base
// with the same membership degree as its degree of trust:
if(!newBeliefs.necessity(fact).isAtLeastAsTrueAs(trust))
newBeliefs.tell(fact, trust);
// Done! Now, replace the original beliefs:
beliefs = newBeliefs;
// Even if we checked not to include redundant facts,
// depending on the order they were inserted, some
// may still be there. Remove them:
beliefs.simplify();
}
Fig. 5. Java code of the belief-change algorithm.
one element belongs in B to degree α, whether Bα
entails the formula. Checking whether a set of for-
mulas entails a given formula is a logical reasoning
problem which may be reduced to the satisfiablility
problem, whose computational complexity varies de-
pending on the specific logic considered, but is in gen-
eral quite high. For instance, satisfiability in propo-
sitional logic (also known as Boolean satisfiability)
is NP-complete [17]; concept satisfiability in descrip-
tion logics goes from polynomial to NEXPTIME-
complete [2]. Therefore, counting the number of en-
tailment checks that have to be performed in order to
apply the proposed syntactic belief change operator
provides a faithful estimate of its computational re-
source requirements.
We study experimentally the performance of the
proposed syntactic belief change operator by the fol-
lowing protocol:
1. given a propositional language Ln with n atomic
proposition, n = 1, 2, . . .;
RND_WFF(β)
– With probability β:
1. randomly choose op ∈ {¬,∧,∨};
2. if op = ¬, return ¬RND_WFF(β);
else return (RND_WFF(β) opRND_WFF(β));
– else, return a random atomic proposition from Ln.
Fig. 6. The algorithm used to generate random propositional formu-
las from Ln.
2. start out with an empty belief base B0 = ∅;
3. generate random formulas φi ∈ Ln, i = 1, 2, . . .,
with the recursive algorithm shown in Figure 6,
which takes a parameter 0 < β < 1 allowing
us to control the expected syntactic depth of the
fomula;
4. generate a random trust degree τi, i = 1, 2, . . .;
5. compute base Bi, i = 1, 2, . . ., as Bi = Bi−1 ∗
τi
φi
, by applying the syntactic belief change oper-
ator.
Figure 7 shows how the number of entailment checks
grows as a function of i for different values of n, while
Figure 8 shows the same for ‖supp(Bi)‖, i.e., the size
of the belief base. The random formulas used to change
beliefs were generated with β = 12 . Since the experi-
ments are random in nature, ten independent trials have
been performed for each value of n; each box-and-
whiskers plot in the two figures represents a distribu-
tion over those trials.
It is quite evident, from these diagrams, that both
the number of entailment checks required to perform a
belief change and the size of the belief base grow less
than linearly with respect to the number of formulas
acquired by an agent. In fact, the entailment checks
appear to stabilize around an average after a number
of belief changes, which increases with the size of the
language.
It is interesting to notice that the number of entail-
ment checks required to perform a belief change ap-
pears to be somehow related to n‖supp(B)‖. In fact,
the data plotted in Figure 9 are fitted by the linear
model
#checks ≃ 2n‖supp(B)‖,
shown as a solid line in Figure 9.
This may be taken as evidence that adopting a syn-
tactic possibilistic representation of beliefs together
with the proposed syntactic operator does not increase
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Fig. 7. Number of entailment checks over a number of subsequent applications i of the syntactic belief change operator for different sizes n of
the propositional language.
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Fig. 8. Cardinality of the belief base over a number of subsequent applications i of the syntactic belief change operator for different sizes n of
the propositional language.
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Fig. 9. Scatter plot of the number of entailment checks required to
perform a belief change against n‖supp(B)‖.
the complexity of belief change with respect to a clas-
sical setting where beliefs are not graded and uncer-
tainty/degree of trust of information sources is not
taken into account.
6. Conclusion
Starting from a possibilistic belief-change opera-
tor proposed in the literature which was defined in
terms of a semantic representation of beliefs, we have
devised its syntactic counterpart, i.e., a possibilistic
belief-change operator that works on a syntactic repre-
sentation of beliefs in the form of a fuzzy belief base,
and that behaves exactly like the semantic operator.
Furthermore, we have performed an empirical study of
the syntatic operator which shows that the cost of per-
forming a revision, as well as the size of the resulting
belief base, remain tractable even after many pieces of
information have been received.
The advantages of being able to work directly on
a syntactic representation should be quite obvious: a
semantic representation of beliefs in terms of a possi-
bility distribution is well-suited to a theoretical treat-
ment of the matter, but does not constitute a serious
candidate for an implementation of any cognitive agent
framework adopting possibility theory for reasoning
about beliefs. Implementations with any ambition to
tackle real-world applications will have necessarily to
resort to a syntactic representation, and thus will have
to use a belief-change operator that works directly on
that representation.
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